Target Centermass

An extremely high-ranking al-Queda member, possibly its number three man, has been captured in Pakistan. With the news, USA Today borders on focusing in the popular-but-wrong direction.

When President Bush said after the 9/11 attacks that he wanted al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden “dead or alive,” few would have thought he would still be at large nearly four years later.

Wednesday brought new hope that for all bin Laden’s elusiveness, he is not entirely safe: Pakistan announced the capture of al-Qaeda’s suspected No. 3 man, Abu Farraj al-Libbi.

Al-Libbi (“the Libyan”) has a string of jaw-dropping allegations against him, including two attempts on the life of Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf in December 2003 and one last year on the country’s prime minister. But the key part of his résumé is that he reportedly stepped into al-Qaeda’s No. 3 role after 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed was captured, also in Pakistan, in March 2003.

The arrest is a reminder of the grinding nature of the war on terror and how progress is incremental and painstaking. It also spotlights the importance of allies — none more so than Pakistan.

After 9/11, Pakistan made the difficult decision to work with the U.S., setting Islamic militants, who hold sway in much of the country, firmly against Musharraf. The relationship is delicate for the U.S., too, since Musharraf is resisting the democracy and freedom the U.S. is also pushing, and because Pakistan has nuclear weapons.

The precise impact of removing known al-Qaeda leaders is uncertain. When one is cut down, back-ups quickly step in. Al-Qaeda cells operate independently. Still, any organization that loses about half of its top 25, as al-Qaeda has since 9/11, loses potency.

Al-Libbi was seized in Pakistan’s wild northwest region, where many believe bin Laden is hiding. Will the trail lead next to bin Laden and his deputy, Egyptian Ayman al-Zawahiri? Al-Libbi’s capture at least revives that possibility. For now, though, removing al-Qaeda’s purported No. 3 inflicts a less-than-mortal wound. Capturing or killing No. 1 and No. 2 would do far more: removing the men whose symbiotic alliance produced the horrors of 9/11.

Look, no one wants bin Laden dead more than me. That said, I see it as a marginal issue in the war against Islamist terror. This is not a campaign against one evil man but rather a campaign against those like him and the culture that allowed him to thrive and would spew forth others of his like to replace him. The USA Today piece does do a good job of reflecting the necessarily grinding nature of this campaign, however, and of realizing the obviously diminished capabilities of the terrorists’ having to plug in understudies into a large chunk of their leadership.

What the USA Today and America need to realize is simply this: the war is not about bin Laden but presenting an alternative society to the one that spawned the beast. And that is where Iraq comes into play — the possibility of a shining Arab city on the hill.

Well, this is what I call stating the obvious — involvement in a war has stressed the military and eaten into supplies.

The United States may not be able to win any new wars as quickly as planned because the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have strained its armed forces, manpower and resources, the nation’s top military officer has told Congress in a secret report.

General Richard Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, described the US military as in a period of increased risk, according to a senior defence official.

“We will prevail,” Gen Myers said when asked about the report. “The timelines [to winning a new war] may have to be extended and we may have to use additional resources, but we’re going to be successful in the end.”

Gen Myers also predicted the risk would go down in a year or two, the official said.

“We are at war and that level of operations does have some impact on troops,” White House spokesman Trent Duffy said. “But the president continues to be confident, as well as his military commanders, that we can meet any threat decisively.” Among the most likely conflicts the Pentagon foresees in the near term are with North Korea and Iran, the two remaining members of President Bush’s “axis of evil”.

About 138,000 American troops are in Iraq. Another 18,000 are in Afghanistan. Military officials have given no precise estimate when they will be able to significantly reduce the number of US troops in Iraq, but some generals have suggested next year.

That the military, dramatically reduced from Cold War numbers, would quickly feel the burden of conflict in two theaters while trying to maintain a ready posture in others is to be expected. So, too, the questioning of resources, as there has been zero effort towards moving the country to any sort of a war economy.

I like the spin that we would be unable to win another war “as quickly as planned” but don’t believe it, as the truthfulness of the statement would really depend upon which war is in question.

In the case of a move into the south by North Korea, I completely believe it, as our forces there have historically been a tripline of sorts. Any action against North Korea has been envisioned as a large advantage in numbers for the communist North and a tremendous advantage in technology and training for the U.S. and South Korea. Add to that decisive advantages of air and naval dominance and the inherent strength of initially fighting on the defensive and you have the long-held formula for Korea: hold on against the numerically-superior onslaught until the allied advantages nullify it and sufficient assets are brought to bear to counterattack..

I also see the slowed-but-certain victory as accurate if conflict with Iran or Syria rolls around. The issue with Iran is that, should push come to shove before our military has had a sufficient recovery period, I envision a much bloodier campaign for the Iranian people than I would’ve hoped would ever be needed. There is a strong undercurrent for democracy among a large portion of the Iranian populace and, given time and successful democratic governments in neighboring Afghanistan and Iraq, this undercurrent could turn into a violent undertow that threatens to drag under the ruling radical theocracy. Should the Iranian government feel this danger and press the issue with the U.S. before the Army and Marines are back to near-full capability, the war would have to be carried from above. And I ain’t talking about with a delicate touch; I mean the brutality of the “Shock and Awe” that was threatened against Iraq but never truly utilized. That would be necessarily tragic.

My main question about Myers’ statement is China. If they move against Taiwan, something they are not currently ready for but are upgrading and training for at breakneck speed, time would be of the essence. Defense of Tiawan does not allow for a buying-time mentality. Any invasion would have to be stopped, as success would hinge on preventing any foothold and build-up by the Chinese. To recover Taiwan after a successful Chinese occupation would be for naught — even if the commies are finally, bloodily expelled, Taiwan would be essentially a nation existing in the past tense.