Author: Gunner

Sorry, but work kept me ’til well past midnight last night, so I just thought I’d throw out a couple of things I’d hoped to comment on before plans went astray.

From Sgt. Hook, there’s this piece called “No Tears in Heaven.” I don’t really know what to excerpt from it; just read it.

Also, Chap points us to the latest from one of my favorites, Ralph Peters, as he looks at the festering situation with Iran.

The most dangerous error we could make in our sharpening confronta tion with Iran is to con vince ourselves that its leaders will act rationally. Few wars are rooted in dispassionate analysis. Self-delusion sparks most such catastrophes.

The power brokers in Tehran may be on the verge of misjudging America’s will and resources as profoundly as did the Japanese on Dec. 7, 1941, or al Qaeda on Sept. 11, 2001.

Stalin misread America’s will when he acquiesced in the Korean Communist invasion of the south. So did Castro, when he imagined that he could impose a tyrannical regime on Grenada.

Saddam Hussein misread America, too. Twice. First, when he convinced himself that he could grab Kuwait with impunity, and, second, when he did his weapons-of-mass-destruction fan dance. (Bulletin for Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad: Don’t play the I’ve-got-weapons-you’d-better-be-afraid-of card.)

Given that historical record, what should we expect of a radical-theocrat regime that has no serious grasp of American psychology, that rules an embittered populace it longs to excite and unify, and that believes it’s literally on a mission from God?

In recent weeks, Tehran has anxiously publicized its tests of surface-to-surface missiles, of air-to-ground missiles and even of torpedoes. The intended point is that, if the shooting starts, Iran can close the Strait of Hormuz to oil tankers – disrupting the global economy – while striking any other target between Israel and Afghanistan.

The crucial question is whether the Iranians are still playing at brinksmanship, hoping to spook us into passivity as they build nuclear weapons, or if they’ve already convinced themselves that a conflict with the United States is inevitable.

Given the closed nature of Iran’s ruling clique, it’s impossible to know.

Indeed, the meaning of such publicly-displayed tests are something to be pondered at, something I’ve trifled with recently. Please read Peters’ column in its entirety, though I want to highlight his conclusion with which I agree most strongly.

Should Tehran ignite a combat exchange, we need to ensure not only that Iran’s nuclear-weapons program is crippled, but that its broader capabilities are shattered.

Militarily, it will be time for our Air Force to prove its worth, with the Navy in support. Iran’s recent experience of conflict is of attrition-based land warfare. But there’s no need for us to employ conventional ground forces inside Iran (special operations troops are another matter). We’ll have to watch the Iraqi and Afghan borders, but our fight would be waged from the air and from the sea.

If we’re pulled into war, we need to strike hard and fast – before Iran’s allies can make mischief in international forums. We should destroy as much of Tehran’s nuclear infrastructure as possible, eliminate its air force and air defenses and wreck its naval facilities beyond repair – no matter the collateral damage. The madmen in Tehran must pay an unbearable price.

The results within Iran would be unpredictable. Fiercely nationalistic, the country’s core Persian population might unify behind the regime, setting back our hopes for an eventual rapprochement with a post-Islamist government.

[…]

But a half-hearted military response to Iranian aggres sion would only strengthen the confidence of our enemies and invite future confrontations.

We pulled too many punches in Operation Iraqi Freedom, and now we’re paying the price. If Tehran drags us into war, we should make the conflict so devastating and painful that even our allies are stunned.

I’ve expressed similar thoughts, too, about our assault on Iraq and its aftermath when I wrote the following:

[The] primary difference between the Iraqi occupation and the post-WWII occupations of Japan and Germany was that the people of the former Axis countries absolutely knew that they had been defeated. So much of the Iraq takeover had been intended to diminish the hardship on the populace and wrap things up in a speedy manner that I don’t think this feeling of defeat was ever sent to the Iraqi people and the Arab world. We shredded a military and the world barely knew it.

That kindness and efficiency has been paid for in blood. Peters is correct when saying, should our hand be forced with Iran, we cannot be seen as so kind again in the eyes of our enemies.