The reality of the impact of actual warfare has left the post-Cold War planning for two simultaneous campaigns shaken, not stirred.
The Pentagon, stretched by the war in Iraq, is considering dropping a linchpin of American military strategy, the doctrine that requires it to be prepared to fight two major wars at the same time.
Since the end of the Cold War the need to be able to fight two “near-simultaneous” wars in different theatres has dominated military thinking, with Iraq and North Korea seen as the most likely battlefields.
Now, with military resources under increasing strain from commitments in Iraq, the Pentagon is considering a new doctrine to take into account the post-September 11 world.
The mission in Iraq has overturned previous military thinking. While it is not officially seen as a “war” it has clearly taken one of the slots from the two-war doctrine, as it continues to absorb the manpower required for a medium-sized war.
Officials said yesterday that among the options for the quadrennial defence review, due early next year, was preparing the military to fight just one major war while setting aside more resources for fighting terrorism and defending the homeland.
Ryan Henry, the principal deputy undersecretary of defence for policy, suggested the “two-war doctrine” may be near the end of its shelf life. The two-war doctrine was born out of the rubble of the Pentagon’s Cold War strategy, which for 40 years had envisaged the Third World War being fought on the plains of Germany.
It was formalised in the wake of the 1991 Gulf war, when the first President George Bush and then his successor, Bill Clinton, were slashing military budgets and the Pentagon saw it as a way of setting a limit to the cuts.
Donald Rumsfeld, the defence secretary, has long promoted an overhaul of military thinking and, when he came to office in 2000, floated the idea that the two-war strategy was on its way out. But it survived the previous review.
I have long held that the cuts of the 1990s were too sharp, too fast. But hey, who am I to judge? I remember in 1996 taking my tank into the field for a weekend field exercise. Because of budget constraints, each and every tank was limited to a whopping twenty gallons of fuel Sunday morning for the return to the motor pool. Here’s a newsflash: twenty gallons doesn’t go very far in a vehicle whose fuel efficiency is calculated in gallons per mile. As per the norm, we were a sweaty bunch at the end of the weekend, but I attribute the stench to more than just the heat of the turret in the late Ft. Hood springtime — no, there was the additional stress of watching the fuel guage on the roadmarch home. Nobody wanted to be on the track that sputtered to a halt and had to be towed.
Obviously, I digress.
Just as obvious, though, is the problem posed by the two-war doctrine, its shift of pressure onto the reserve components, the drag of a decade-long high rate of deployment for policing and peace-keeping, and the strain of the Afghani and Iraqi theaters of operations. The possibilities? First, deny the issue and maintain the present course of pretending. Second, expand the military to actually be to handle the requirements of the two-war doctrine. Third, revise the doctrine to face the current needs of the war against Islamist terror by streamlining forces and planning for a capability of one war and defensive postures elsewhere. McQ at QandO points out a key deficiency in the latter.
OK. That means going back to a one conventional conflict army which may, may I say, be seen as a weakness by various players out there (such as China, North Korea and Iran).
Tie the US up with a conventional confrontation (maybe via proxy) and then have your way (many have seen that as something China might consider in regards to taking Taiwan)on a second front.
Yes, there is always the threat of a truly bloody and involved ground campaign to be considered.
How you loving that peace dividend now?
