Our efforts in against the Taliban and al Queda in the Afghan-Pakistani region just took a tremendous step backwards.
History repeats itself but in Pakistan’s case, it perhaps repeats itself rather too often. And so the government and militants in the volatile North Waziristan tribal region have signed a peace agreement and quite understandably, Governor Ali Mohammad Jan Aurakzai, the chief architect of the accord, has hailed it as an unprecedented event.
Unprecedented it is. Like a pendulum, the government policy has swung from one extreme to another, from the use of brute military force to what appears to be total capitulation to militants. Never did the government try to intelligently combine the use of force with pursuit of dialogue.
Jirga parleys were conducted in extreme secrecy with Governor Aurakzai emerging as the focal person and President Musharraf’s pointsman on the government’s policy on Fata.
This was good in that instead of operating multiple channels to negotiate with militants which often complicated matters, the government was speaking with one voice.
So, if there is one man who can claim credit for the agreement, it should be Governor Aurakzai who single-mindedly cobbled the deal together; of course with the help of JUI-F leader Maulana Fazlur Rehman.
It was Mr Aurakzai, who as the Peshawar Corps Commander had led the Pakistan Army into the tribal region in 2001. And being a native of the tribal region that straddle the Pakistan-Afghan border, the onus was again on him to pull the army out of what has proven to be a quagmire.
Just to recap. Before signing the agreement, the government virtually agreed to meet all the demands of the militants. Captured militants were freed, their weapons were returned, all privileges were restored, 12 checkposts were abandoned and troops stationed there have been relocated to forts.
Unlike the past agreements however, there are some new elements in the peace deal signed in Miramshah on Tuesday.
The government has also undertaken not to launch any ground and air operation and to resolve the issue in accordance with local riwaj or customs.
Foreign militants could either leave the tribal region or live there peacefully and abide by the law of the land. This is a major concession, considering the fact that the government had been insisting all along that all foreign militants must get themselves registered.
Significantly however, barely an hour after the peace agreement had been signed, a spokesman for the militants insisted that there were no foreign militants in North Waziristan and that despite what the government had been saying it had not been able to produce any evidence of their presence in the tribal region.
He also denied that militants were crossing over into Afghanistan to carry out attacks on Afghan and coalition forces.
The denial is reminiscent of refusal by militants in the neighbouring South Waziristan Agency to admit to the presence of foreign militants there — an issue that led to the collapse of the famous Shakai agreement in 2004.
On the face of it, the agreement does look good but as they say, the proof of the pudding is in the eating. What is important is not the three-page document itself but whether the two sides would be able to implement it.
Will the foreigners leave? Unlikely. But why would they be here?
They have nowhere to go. Their countries do not accept them and worse, they will be prosecuted there. Will foreign and local militants stop their ‘Jihad’? Not likely.
Not likely indeed. In fact, with the recent bleeding of Taliban elements by NATO forces in Afghanistan, I would actually expect an influx of radical elements into Waziristan after another brutal failure of a Taliban spring offensive is greeted with the news of a safer-than-expected haven just across the line on the map.
Although this is potentially a move that will extend instability in the Afghan theater, I understand the need of the Pakistani government, living on a volatile razor’s edge, to make occasional moves to mollify a fairly radical and militant populace while maintaining a degree of friendship with the U.S. and the West. I have long held, dating back to much contemplation following 9/11, that the stability of Pakistan’s government held the key in avoiding a global hot war, as its downfall replaced by radicals would almost certainly draw in India and create a domino effect of bloodshed.
Even with that understanding and that need for Pakistani stability, I think this is the wrong move at the wrong time and will almost certainly cost American and NATO lives in the long term.