Hopes and Problems of Iraq Drawdown

Last night I mentioned a leaked British memo regarding planned troop reductions. I put forth that, even if the memo was valid, its subject material should be considered tentatively optimistic. Well, that has proven accurate.

A leaked British Defence Ministry memorandum has confirmed that London and Washington hope to reduce troop strengths in Iraq next year – but also reveals some of the problems.

The memo does not indicate that basic policy has changed or will change. This is that the troops will be there “as long as is needed”.

But the plan is that not so many will be needed.

The authenticity of the memo has been confirmed by the British Defence Secretary John Reid, who signed it.

He has called it an [sic] “scenarios” document, but it was prepared for the cabinet committee on defence and foreign policy and it demonstrates how seriously the British government is considering how to reduce its commitment.

These are the hopes:

  • British troops could be reduced from 8,500 now to 3,000 by the middle of next year.
  • US troops could be cut from 176,000 to 60,000.

These are the problems:

Everything depends on handing over security to Iraqi control. This in turn depends on the build-up, training and ability of Iraqi security forces.

A handover should happen in two British-controlled provinces, Muthanna and Maysan, in October and the two others, Dhi Qar and Basra, in April 2006.

In the far more dangerous US sector, where most of the fighting is taking place, there are also plans to place security in Iraqi hands in most of the provinces next year.

However – and it is a big however, especially in the US sector – the memo indicates strong disagreements within military staffs about the wisdom of this planning.

The Pentagon and the US Central Command are said to favour large cuts, while local American commanders are more doubtful. These on-the-ground officers feel it is too soon to think about such reductions.

The piece goes on to look at the political pressures, obvious though they may be, that drove the sunshine-on-my-shoulders best-case-scenario memo, as well as the inherent risks to such a sizable early withdrawal.

As for me, I’m in favor of either a complete withdrawal or an increase in forces, or somewhere in between, depending on the actual situation on the ground at the time. I’m certainly against any scheduled withdrawal written in stone, though I would hope that our governments and militaries are planning for all reasonable contingencies.