In your letter you said you didn’t love me
You said you’re gonna leave me
But you could’ve said it better
Oh in your letter, you said you couldn’t face me
You said you could replace me
But you could’ve said it better
—REO Speedwagon
Well, yes, aspects of a released letter from al Queda’s second-string quarterback Ayman al-Zawahiri to Triple-A Iraq League QB Abu al-Zarqawi indeed could be considered chilling … given the big “if” that the anti-war factions in the West get their way and the U.S. bails before the mission of an established democratic Iraq is actually accomplished.
Senior U.S. intelligence officials call a letter from al Qaeda’s No. 2 man to its leader in Iraq “chilling” because of how “calm, clear and well argued” it is in urging preparation for a U.S. departure from Iraq.
According to a translation of the 6,300-word letter provided by the U.S. government, Ayman al-Zawahiri predicts “the Americans will exit soon” from Iraq and says “things may develop faster than we imagine.”
[…]
The letter outlines a four-stage plan to expand the war in Iraq: Expel U.S. forces, establish an Islamic authority, take the fight to Iraq’s secular neighbors and battle with Israel — “because Israel was established only to challenge any new Islamic entity.”
The letter says: “We must be ready starting now, before events overtake us, and before we are surprised by the conspiracies of the Americans and the United Nations and their plans to fill the void behind them.”
First, yes, we are still feeling the repercussions of our tail-between-the-legs withdrawals from Viet Nam and Somalia. The lesson learned by the world and the radical Islamist jihadists in particular: bloody the Americans and they will falter, wilt and betray their own ideals.
Second, there are no “conspiracies” about what we hope to leave behind us in Iraq. Our plans are quite transparent and disgusting to the radical Islamists — we simply hope to inject a virus into the Middle East and the heart of the sprawling Islamic world. That virus? Liberty and self-determination, the opportunity to build a better life for one’s self and one’s family, notions that are an anathema to we-are-victims-kill-the-oppressors feeding trough from which the Jihadists, and arguably most of the current ruling Arab governments, gather their sustenence.
That said, there is much hope in this letter, as the Jihadist Zawahiri seems to be almost as concerned about losing the media war as I have been. I still feel that our media has been far too beneficial to our enemy’s cause, but it is interesting to note that the bad guys are concerned about hearts and minds and especially throats. Oh yeah, other Muslim targets also may be problematic for the bastards’ cause.
“I say to you: that we are in a battle, and that more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media,” al-Zawahiri writes.
“The Muslim populace who love and support you will never find palatable … the scenes of slaughtering the hostages,” he warns al-Zarqawi, self-proclaimed leader of al Qaeda in Iraq.
Al-Zawahiri also criticizes al-Zarqawi’s attacks on Shiites and reminds him that Shiite Iran is holding more than 100 al Qaeda prisoners — many of them leaders such as Saif al-Adel and Osama bin Laden’s son, Saad.
“Is the opening of another front now in addition to the front against the Americans and the government a wise decision?” al-Zawahiri asks. “Or does this conflict with Shia lift the burden from the Americans by diverting the mujahedeen to the Shia, while the Americans continue to control matters from afar?”
The U.S. strongly vouches for the authenticity of the letter, and some have interesting ways of characterizing the document.
A senior U.S. intelligence official said he was “absolutely confident” the letter is genuine.
This official described the letter’s language as that of “an al Qaeda elder to an occasionally hotheaded field commander” — language, sources said, that President Bush had seen before he delivered a speech on the war on terror last week.
“It is cowardice that seeks to kill children and the elderly with car bombs and cuts the throat of a bound captive and targets worshippers leaving a mosque,” President Bush said October 6.
Nice retort by the president — just the sort of tone to counter current terror tactics in Iraq. I find the elder-field commander analogy interesting. Make no mistake, Zawahiri and Zarqawi ain’t no Eisenhower and Patton. After all, recall any stories of General Patton trying to mooch a few bucks off ol’ Dwight David?
Dated two days after the London terror attacks of July 7, the letter makes no mention of those attacks and pleads for more information, suggesting al-Zawahiri is feeling cut off.
He describes difficulties he and al Qaeda are facing more than a dozen times; says the real danger to him comes from Pakistani army operations in the tribal areas; and asks al-Zarqawi whether he could spare a “hundred thousand” dollars.
We absolutely must stay the course, as the enemy is obviously in disagreement over tactics and disarray over resources.
Meanwhile, this piece looks at the letter and sees a potentially more ominous note for al Queda.
There are signs of tension within the al-Qaida leadership, and between them and their followers in Iraq, says a reporter who has followed the movement closely.
“I think there’s something going on between (al-Qaida leader Osama) bin Laden and (his deputy Ayman al-)Zawahiri. I think Zawahiri is not absolutely happy with what’s going on. I would even go as far as suggesting that maybe Zawahiri doesn’t really know where bin Laden is,” said Yosri Fouda, investigative reporter for the Arabic-language al-Jazeera television network.
[…]
“He was rather concerned about his own constituency, his own supporters,” commented Foudra of Zawahiri’s letter.
Others blogging on the letter: Belmont Club, Jawa Report, In the Bullpen.
Comments
5 responses to “Al Qaeda Letter Called ‘Chilling’”
[…] Update: Another good analysis of the letter is at Target Centermass. Gunner cites an article on CNN where unknown “Senior U.S. intelligence officials” describe the letter is ‘chilling’ because how “calm, clear and well argued” the letter is. Gunner doesn’t find it chilling, and frankly neither do I. Is it supposed to shock us how intelligent Zawahiri actually is? He’s never rushed things, and he certainly did not rush the letter. He put plenty of thought into it and it is well reasoned. […]
We have a commentary on it here at CENTCOM. It’s online in both the original Arabic and in an English translation. Very interesting stuff! It’s up here:
http://www.centcom.mil/extremistssay.asp
I’ll paste CENTCOM’s commentary on the letter below. The full version is available at the above link. Feel free to use it or link to it! Let me know if you need anything!
All the best,
–SPC Richardson
CENTCOM Public Affairs
ZAWAHIRI-ZARQAWI COMMUNIQUÉ
Key Themes
11 October 2005
We note seven critical themes from the Zawahiri-Zarqawi letter. The first four confirm al-Qaida’s long-term strategy and core beliefs; the latter three reflect new information about how senior al-Qaida leader Zawahiri views developments in Iraq – and elsewhere – turning against them.
Further confirmation of al-Qaida’s long-term strategy/beliefs:
• Iraq is becoming the central battlefield for al-Qaida senior leaders in Pakistan . Zawahiri views Iraq as the bridgehead for the creation of a new Islamic caliphate – their ultimate objective. The letter makes clear al-Qa’ida intends to wrest control of Iraq from the Iraqi people so they can use the country in pursuit of other goals.
o Quote: “I want to be the first to congratulate you for what God has blessed you with in terms of fighting in the heart of the Islamic world, which was formerly the field for major battles in Islam’s history, and what is now the place for the greatest battle of Islam in this era….â€
• Al-Qaida’s ambitions do not stop at Iraq ’s borders. Establishing the political dominance of Sunni militants in Iraq is only a first step—a means to an end—in realizing al-Qaida’s ambitions of imposing its control over the broader Middle East. In fact, al-Qaida’s focus on Iraq has nothing to do with Iraqi nationalism, but is purely instrumental as a beachhead for al-Qaida’s broader agenda. Under al-Qaida, Iraq will serve as a terrorist haven and staging ground for attacks against Iraq ’s neighbors and quite possibly Western nations — all those judged to be ruling in violation of their distorted interpretation of Islamic law – and clearly destabilize the region. According to Zawahiri:
o Quote: “…the Jihad in Iraq requires several incremental goals: The first stage: Expel the Americans from Iraq . The second stage: Establish an Islamic authority or amirate, then develop it and support it until it achieves the level of a caliphate over as much territory as you can spread its power in Iraq, i.e., in Sunni areas. . . . The third stage: Extend the jihad wave to the secular countries neighboring Iraq . The fourth stage: …[This is ] the clash with Israel , because Israel was established only to challenge any new Islamic entity. . . . [T]heir ongoing mission is to establish an Islamic state, and defend it, and for every generation to hand over the banner to the one after it until the Hour of Resurrection.â€
o Quote: “It has always been my belief that the victory of Islam will never take place until a Muslim state is established in the manner of the Prophet in the heart of the Islamic world, specifically, in the Levant, Egypt , and the neighboring states of the Peninsula and Iraq ; however, the center would be in the Levant and Egypt .â€
• The letter demonstrates that pulling US forces out of Iraq is the wrong approach – that terrorists will not simply lay down their arms when American forces depart Iraq . Al-Qaida and its terrorist brethren will not go away when the Coalition hands over security control to Iraqi forces; rather, they are committed to overthrowing the elected, democratic Iraqi government and ruling the country according to their interpretation of Islamic law.
o Quote: “And it is that the Mujahidin must not have their mission end with the expulsion of the Americans from Iraq , and then lay down their weapons, and silence the fighting zeal. We will return to having the secularists and traitors holding sway over us.â€
• Zawahiri believes in religious intolerance and converting, conquering, or killing anyone who does not believe as he does. His only concern is how to deceive the population that this is not the case by urging Zarqawi to reduce attacks on Shia civilians. Zawahiri contends that Shia are heretics. He views Shi’ism as a “religious school based on excess and falsehood,†and as a danger to what he sees as true, Sunni Islam. Zawahiri does not condemn Zarqawi for killing Shia. Indeed, the Shia, along with anyone who does not blindly follow al-Qaida’s twisted interpretation of Islam, will be forced either to adopt al-Qa’ida’s extremist ideology or face repression or death if the terrorists establish control. Zawahiri’s concerns are purely tactical; managing the press and gaining the support, or acquiescence, of the people.
o Quote: “People of discernment and knowledge among Muslims know the extent of danger to Islam of the 12’er school of Shi’ism. It is a religious school based on excess and falsehood whose function is to accuse the companions of Muhammad of heresy [in] a campaign against Islam, in order to free the way for a group of those who call for a dialogue in the name of the hidden mahdi who is in control of existence and infallible in what he does. Their prior history in cooperating with the enemies of Islam is consistent with their current reality of connivance with the crusaders.â€
o Quote: “The collision between any state based on the model of prophecy with the Shi’ites is a matter that will happen sooner or later. This is the judgment of history, and these are the fruits to be expected from the rejectionist Shi’a sect and their opinion of the Sunnis. These are clear, well-known matters to anyone with a knowledge of history, the ideologies, and the politics of states.â€
o Quote: “[M]any of your Muslim admirers amongst the common folk are wondering about your attacks on the Shi’a.â€
How al-Qaida views the developments in Iraq – and elsewhere – as turning against them:
• Zawahiri clearly is worried they are losing public support in Iraq, and is attuned to the role of the media in the battle for such support. Zawahiri emphasizes that the struggle is ideological, with each side competing for the popular support and loyalty of the Muslim world. Zarqawi’s methods are backfiring by alienating the Iraqi people with attacks against the Shia.
o Quote: “…[W]e will see that the strongest weapon which the Mujahidin enjoy . . . is popular support from the Muslim masses in Iraq , and the surrounding Muslim countries. So, we must maintain this support as best we can, and we should strive to increase it….â€
o Quote: “[T]he Jihadist movement must avoid any action that the masses do not understand or approve. . . .â€
o Quote: “I say to you: that we are in a battle, and that more than half this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media. And that we are in a media battle in a race for the hearts and minds of our nation.â€
• Zawahiri, who previously termed democracy heretical, is willing to exploit the political process unfolding in Iraq to advance the group’s goals. Zawahiri is advocating a modified strategy in an attempt to expand the group’s Sunni support base in Iraq . It is tacit acknowledgement that the political process unfolding in Iraq appeals to average Iraqis. Zarqawi’s recent pronouncements for all-out war against the Shia and recent rhetoric against Sunnis supporting the government and coalition stirred concerns among his advisers and allies and already have prompted Zarqawi to quickly adjust his rhetoric and some tactics.
o Quote: “We don’t want to repeat the mistake of the Taliban, who restricted participation in governance to the students and the people of Kandahar alone. They did not have any representation for the Afghan people in their ruling regime, so the result was that the Afghan people disengaged themselves from them.â€
o Quote: “I stress again to you and to all your brothers the need to direct the political action equally with the military action, by the alliance, cooperation and gathering of all leaders of opinion and influence in the Iraqi arena. . . . [Y]ou and your brothers must strive to have around you circles of support, assistance, and cooperation, and through them, to advance until you become a consensus, entity, organization, or association that represents all the honorable people and the loyal folks in Iraq .â€
• Zawahiri’s letter to Zarqawi reveals continued points of weakness in Pakistan-based al-Qaida senior leaders and what they need to operate and survive:
o Financial shortages: Zawahiri asks for a payment of approximately 100,000 of an unspecified currency until “new lines†– likely with donors – are opened. Moreover, he makes this request in the context of Abu Faraj al-Libi, intimating that his capture adversely affected al-Qaida’s ability to transfer funds.
• Quote: “The brothers informed me that you suggested to them sending some assistance. Our situation since Abu-al-Faraj is good by the grace of God, but many of the lines have been cut off. Because of this, we need a payment while new lines are being opened. So, if you’re capable of sending a payment of approximately 100,000 [units of currency] we’ll be very grateful to you.â€
o The CT efforts of our partners: Furthermore, Zawahiri notes that while they may have limited the consequences of Abu Faraj’s capture, al-Qaida is wary of the Pakistani army’s presence in the tribal areas where its leaders have found sanctuary. This highlights the importance of continued Pakistani efforts in the War on Terror. As partnerships and partnership capacity expands, so shrinks the space in which terrorists can operate.
• Quote: “[T]he real danger comes from the agent Pakistani army which is carrying out operations in the tribal areas looking for Mujahidin.â€
o Isolation of senior leadership. Zawahiri appeals to Zarqawi for information about the situation and activities in Iraq .
• Quote: “Likewise I would like you to inform us about the Iraqi situation in general and the situation of the Mujahidin in particular in [sufficient] detail. . . . At the least, we should know as much as the enemy knows.â€
Fascinating!
I just read the English translation of the letter on CENTCOM and was quite surprised to find at the end:
“By God, if by chance you’re going to Fallujah, send greetings to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.”
I thought this letter was written to Zarqawi?
SPC Richardson,
Thanks very much for the info. Interesting.
Nutt,
Nice, intriguing catch. I’ll be honest: I don’t know what to make of that. It could be code and, if so, I would have no idea what it could represent. It could be that the letter was actually addressed to a Zarqawi underling with the intention to be passed upwards. I just don’t know or want to guess.