War is mainly a catalogue of blunders.
—Winston Churchill
The above quote is most assuredly true and unavoidable. War is a series of traps, a string of opportunities for error. Perhaps the most difficult pitfall to avoid actually begins before combat commences. In fact, it begins immediately in the aftermath of the previous conflict, be it a small engagement or a worldwide conflagration of hostility, and continues on into the next conflict. Put simply, the mistake I write of is the misuse or neglect of possible lessons to be learned. I’ll leave it to Cyril Falls to put it more eloquently:
Those who study warfare only in the light of history think of the next war in terms of the last. But those who neglect history deprive themselves of a yardstick by which theory can be measured.
The obvious mistake is to misinterpret or neglect the abundant information available, be it from failures or successes. An example of this would be the successful torpedo-plane attack on Taranto in early World War II. The Japanese chose to learn from the British air success against a shallow, sheltered harbor, while the Americans learned little or nothing from the sinking of three Italian battleships. Result: five American battleships sunk at Pearl Harbor, less than thirteen months later.
The more subtle trap is to fall into the thinking that the next war will be fought in the manner of the previous one. This leads to limitations on both strategic and tactical thinking and their subsequent effect on training and preparation. Drawing from WWII again, an easily identified example is that of the French. Having seen the trench warfare, relatively stable fronts and bloody results of attacks against fortified positions, the French relied too heavily on this experience with their dependence on the fixed fortifications of the Maginot Line. Result: the capitulation of France to Nazi Germany in just six weeks.
During my time in the National Guard, I saw first-hand this type of thinking, at both a strategic and tactical level. Even into the latter ’90s, much of the US armor training was based on the planned defense-and-counterattack of the anticipated massive tank showdown with the Soviets in Europe. On a small-scale level, my platoon was going through a move-to-contact engagement on the tank simulators at Ft. Knox (I’m talking about the old platoon-to-battalion level SimNet, which may or may not still be in use). The exercise was late in the day and the platoon reacted poorly to the eventual enemy attack. Overnight, the platoon leadership planned for the same exercise, anticipating the meeting with the OpFor to be in the same location. Sure enough, as the engagement was rerun the following morning, the enemy were in the same location and were decimated. We had made a mistake and been rewarded for it — wrong lesson learned.
Military history is replete with examples of both lessons that were failed to be grasped and lessons that were learned too rigidly. How best to avoid this trap? Learn the lessons of the previous conflict but don’t allow them to exclusively dictate doctrine or tactics. Innovate while anticipating innovation. Despite the above case of Pearl Harbor, along with my own examples and many more throughout our history, the modern American military has generally been pretty good about this, overcoming the potential pitfalls with flexibility and innovation. One of my old lieutenants liked to say, “We train in chaos.” (He also, in his fair share, was fond of saying, “I’ll get the next pitcher.” He’s still a dear friend.) This has been noticed by our foes as well, as a Soviet military document apparently held the following gem:
One of the serious problems in planning against American doctrine that the Americans do not read their manuals nor do they feel any obligations to follow their doctrine.
So far in the war against Islamist terror, this potential trap has played to our advantage. In Afghanistan, the Taliban felt secure without a build-up for a repeat of the Soviet engagement. In Iraq, Saddam and his military seemed paralyzed when the ground onslaught took off without a lengthy air campaign, as was expected from the first Gulf War. In both, the US used innovation and adaptation to overcome the enemy without allowing them the luxury of benefitting from their acquired experience.
A trio of historical examples are driving today’s war — Viet Nam in general, Tet specifically, and Mogadishu. The Islamists are hoping that a slow bleed or a sudden hemorrhage will cripple the will of the American public.
Which is stronger — the will of the American people to succeed or their fear of the failures of our history? The hopes of our current enemy based on our past or the future imaginative actions of the American military?
I anticipate having children someday. They and their children will live in the world that results from the answer to that.