China: Projecting the Power Projection

Previously, I’ve blogged about a recent Pentagon report looking at the modernization program undertaken by the Chinese military, writing the following:

This is important as, on the ground, China has the obvious numerical advantage. Their problem would be in projecting this power. The areas they are focusing upon (missiles, aircraft, subs) are crucial in their ability to threaten Taiwan and blunt our ability to support the Taiwanese defenses.

Similarly, I’ve examined a proposed piece of Chinese anti-seccession legislation which China could use as a legal foundation for an assault on Tiawan. In that post, I concluded as follows:

Though they are working to upgrade and enhance their forces, it is doubtful that China currently has the air and naval capabilities to attack and bring about a successful conclusion before the impact of U.S. assistance to Taiwan is felt. A failed assault by China could possibly serve to strengthen Taiwan’s position in international circles while weakening China’s at home.

Again, just last night I again warned about a possible arm race looming with China as they seek to upgrade their ability to project their power.

Call it just lucky timing, as today I found an extensive and detailed examination of the matter by McQ over at the QandO blog. McQ has done an excellent job of drawing on several sources to flesh out Chinese strategy, both in the immediate future and for decades.

McQ starts from essentially the same baseline that I did.

One of China’s problems, in that regard, has been its inability, militarily to attack Taiwan and then sustain its army. A) it doesn’t have the military transport (in shipping) to land and sustain an army on Taiwan and B) it doesn’t have the navy to protect those sealanes (i.e. the Taiwan straits) even if it did have the transport.

China has the air transport to accomplish an airborne invasion, but airborne troops are very light fighters and would be overwhelmed fairly quickly. What China needs, obviously, is naval shipping which can land troops and armor for that type of an operation.

After that, McQ’s research points towards a more dire near-future situation than I had previously estimated.

I’m not trying to be an alarmist here, and certainly if the Chinese are only getting a few Zubars to check out, it would argue against an imminent invasion of Taiwan. But to me the signs are unmistakable.

Another obvious part of any plan to invade Taiwan would be their navy, and the most important requirement for their navy is to be of the strength and capablity to hold the Taiwan Straits indefinitely in order for any invasion force to have a chance at success.

Are the Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) preparing for that? According to reports, they may very well be doing exactly that with a two phase strategic plan.

[…]

Personally, and this is my opinion, I think Taiwan’s days are numbered if China is successful in implementing the plan outlined here. It will be a few decades from now but it seems apparent that China has plans to take the island whether the US or the world care.

There’s an eye-opening amount of information in McQ’s work — go give it a read.